Customize Consent Preferences

We use cookies to help you navigate efficiently and perform certain functions. You will find detailed information about all cookies under each consent category below.

The cookies that are categorized as "Necessary" are stored on your browser as they are essential for enabling the basic functionalities of the site. ... 

Always Active

Necessary cookies are required to enable the basic features of this site, such as providing secure log-in or adjusting your consent preferences. These cookies do not store any personally identifiable data.

No cookies to display.

Functional cookies help perform certain functionalities like sharing the content of the website on social media platforms, collecting feedback, and other third-party features.

No cookies to display.

Analytical cookies are used to understand how visitors interact with the website. These cookies help provide information on metrics such as the number of visitors, bounce rate, traffic source, etc.

No cookies to display.

Performance cookies are used to understand and analyze the key performance indexes of the website which helps in delivering a better user experience for the visitors.

No cookies to display.

Advertisement cookies are used to provide visitors with customized advertisements based on the pages you visited previously and to analyze the effectiveness of the ad campaigns.

No cookies to display.

Loading...
Most Recent Stories

10 REASONS NOT TO WORRY ABOUT THE EURO

A bit of contrarian thinking here from Credit Suisse.  10 reasons not to worry about the Euro.  Naturally, I disagree:

(1) No political party is suggesting that any country should leave the Euro.

(2) The weak Euro is a critical part of the survival plan. If the Euro weakened to parity (quite possible) this would boost GDP by nearly 2%.(3) The help packages announced amount to nearly 80% of government debt in Spain, Portugal and Greece.

(4) The cost of Spain, Greece and Portugal exiting the Euro could easily be $400bn (this is because European banks have $1.3trn of assets in these countries and with net foreign debt of 70% to 90% of GDP, a sharp decline in devaluation would, we think, lead to a loss of around 30% on these assets). If this is the cost for core Europe of a country exiting the Euro, then surely core Europe should spend this amount to keep the countries in the Euro.

(5) Peripheral Europe can accept more deflation than investors realise (Ireland and Latvia GDP are down by 20% from peak).

(6) The ECB has already done two U-turns already, so a third (open-ended QE) is quite possible (we note that the ECB balance sheet has expanded by 60% since the start of the credit crisis).

(7) The SNB has joined the ECB in QE. Last month it bought around €40 to €50bn of European bonds/bills without sterilising (Why? SwFr denominated loans in EMEA).

(8) Spain is critical (11% of Euro GDP and $1.1trn of global banks assets in Spain). We calculate that even if the bank bail-out is as bad as Thailand/Malaysia in 1997, total government debt would end up at 90% (from 66%) which is still OK.

(9) Greece restructures when it is safe to do so (2011 onwards), we think. Each year, European banks make $300bn of pre provisioning profits. A Greek debt restructuring would cost about $100bn (and probably they would extend maturity profiles and allow banks not to mark it to market if the bond is paid back at par).

(10) It is only in Greece and Spain’s interest to leave the Euro and default once they are running a primary budget surplus (i.e. a budget surplus before interest payments). They will not be in this position until 2012 and 2014 respectively.

Source: CS

Comments are closed.