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DEEP THOUGHTS ON THE BALANCE SHEET RECESSION BY RICHARD KOO

11 April 2010 by Cullen Roche 16 Comments

A must see interview here from Richard Koo at the recent INET conference:

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Comments
  • Lecher

    Nice video. He is good at taking a seemingly complex situation and explaining it in a way that almost anyone can understand. Thanks for the link.

  • Fred

    Keynes 101.

    • Cullen Roche TPC

      Koo thinks we can spend our way out of this. But the disconnect remains. As the government continues to pile more money into the problem the private sector remains very weak. The question is – can the government just spend and spend ad infinitum and continue to paper over the real problems?

      Call me skeptical. And if there is any shred of evidence that this hasn’t worked it will all crater in dramatic fashion. Just wait for the spike in commodity prices, followed by bubbly markets, a collapse in consumer spending, a collapse in China and then the return of global deflation….I’d peg this at 40% odds now….

      • VCC

        TPC,

        Ideally we export our way out like Japan did. Only problem is, our manufacturing sector is in shambles compared to what it was. If the govt stops spending, who picks up the slack? That’s why I think there’s a market collapse coming. Govt can’t and won’t keep spending, the consumer is tapped out, and the baton will inevitably fail to pass successfully from public to private sector.

        Bernanke has only one play in his playbook: print more money. Wall St and Washington are the beneficiaries of such a policy and they think the worst is over. The rest of the country is left scratching their heads at this wild optimism. Things look awfully ugly from my main street perch.

        • Cullen Roche TPC

          I think there are very real signs of recovery, but we’re nearing the make or break point for Bernanke. I’d like to see how comfortable he feels if oil breaches $100 by Summer. He’s herding all this money out of cash and into risk assets without thinking about the repercussions.

          • Mike

            TPC,

            I would argue that the “marginal” consumers have been powering the recovery effort. I defined marginal as those people who are getting transfer payment via unemployment checks and the stealth bailout of delinquent home borrowers. I would estimate that the stealth bailout comes to about 6-9 billion a month. Most of this are being borne by the FED, Fannie, and Freddie. With these delinquent borrowers having that additional 1000-1500/month in essentially disposable income and given that many will not save this windfall, I would argue that much of it is circulating through the economy right now. With monetary velocity, I would think that would be equivalent to about 20-30 billion or more marginal spending. Already there are signs that the foreclosure/short sale/deed-in-lieu process is starting to accelerate. This implies that we may start to lose these marginal consumers. We will have to see how much this affect overall spending.

            • Jeff

              How did you come up with those numbers? Even so, 20-30 billion doesn’t seem to be a great dent to an economy with trillions in circulation.

              It seems Gov spending is the only way to keep this economy afloat until the private sector picks up the slack. The problem will be how to get rid of all these gov programs once we recover. (And that gov spending doesn’t lead to real growth)

              I’ve read about worries for deflation (means a greater chance for a double dip) but it seems that inflation is the more appropriate action. (Which probably means more bubbles)

              • Mike

                the 6 to 9 billion is an estimate base upon the reported number of 5-6 million mortgages in delinquency. I estimated that monthly payment is about 1000-1500. I might be wrong about the 5-6 million though as I have heard that the number is heading up again. the 20-30 billion is based upon a multiplier effect of 3-5 times. It may be low however. The point I was trying to make is that these marginal consumers are what separate the bleehh earnings from the good earnings being reported right now. Sales tax are better than expected is because of this phenomenon also. Interestingly the recent report from consumer metric post could signal the tightening effect from the increased pace of the liquidation process for these delinquencies.

                Also you have to remember that a lot of the money .gov pumped into the economy really have not filtered down that much to J6Ps. The stealth bailout of delinquent borrowers gets the money to J6Ps instantaneously.

        • eludog

          TPC, this is exactly what will happen. I think 40% is a very conservative call on your part. Isn’t it obvious this is happening right now?

          I think Ben is looking through a very narrow lens right now. To fight the Great Depression currently is to fight the wrong fight. We are in a completely different situation than the GD and Ben just doesn’t see it. All the cheap money has infused debt driven demand. This type of demand is simply borrowing from future demand. We will hit the tipping point when commodities explode to levels that drag down consumer demand.

          I put a 75% probability on this market going up a few more months with commodities leading. Then the next phase of this secular global adjustment will occur.

  • Tom Elmo

    Actually things are lining up nicely for continued government spending. Baby boomers retiring and universal health care. The timing is good. Better this than depending on a war (like WW2) to get out of the depression.

    The other way is to make bankruptcy a lot easier.

    • Cullen Roche TPC

      I’d argue that the forms of government spending in the pipeline are far less efficient than will be required. Plus, the WW2 comps are a bit unfair. We destroyed our two largest economic competitors in WW2. Of course we recovered.

      I wish organic economic growth were as easy as hitting the “return” button at the Fed. But it’s not.

  • B Ferro

    I like Koo. The appeal of differentiating between the yin / yang of cycles is very palatable, as is the combination approach of Keynesian / monetarist policies to combat balance sheet recessions. However, one of his central assumptions against the latter is that no amount of monetary stimulus can ever work to significantly reinflte asset prices, specifically equities and real estate. While true in Japan on both accounts through the 1990s, we all now know post 75% rally in the SPX that this hasn’t been the case in the U.S. circa today with equities. So, I guess he loses some credibility from me given that his balance sheet recession theories seem to preclude the possibility of what we’ve actually witnessed since March 09.

    • Cullen Roche TPC

      Japan experienced several 50%+ rallies over the last 20 years. The cyclical bear persisted, however.

  • NoWonder

    Madoff should have simply borrowed money from clients who previously withdrew profits. This way he could continue to show good returns, allowing later participants to “repair their balance sheets.”

    Careful: if you stop even for a moment your “economy” may suffer a contraction.

  • GreenAB

    Koo always is a refreshing read.
    but i still don´t get why so many there give him so much credit.

    of course it would be great if we could have macroeconomic policies that guarantee uninterrupted growth.

    but that is just a pipe dream imo.
    we´re living in a world where laws of nature apply, which means that if you´re overpowering you have to rest at some point in order to regain strength and go again.

    1.)when discussing stimulus i have read none economist who looks at the past and current. let´s say the economy grew above long term trend for 5years.
    bubbles developed in asset prices, inventories surged and capacity increased.
    how and WHY do you stimulate when the economy is largely oversupplied?
    where do you direct capital in a way that it works efficiently and keeps the economy moving forward?
    the more saturated an economy the less bang you get four each buck borrowed and spent.
    in the regard China will be interesting to watch in the years to come.

    2.)bubbles will be even bigger.
    take the biggest parts of the economy that are most likely to be stimulated in a downturn, like housing, auto manufacturing or financials.
    if you know that the government stands ready to push demand indefinitely once the economy weakens – why should take responsible decisions as a business leader?
    of course you´d take on more risk consequently taking inflation higher.

    3.)the third issue is with Keynesian theory itself:

    you stimulate when the economy is weak. you save when the economy is booming. right?
    for the overwhelming part of the last 30 years the economy was growing.
    so HOW come that the deficit is in the record trillions today?
    the reason is that you will never find a politician who will put the savings part into action. if there ever is a surplus, it will be spent! (or you can forget reelection)

    4.)outside there´s a MARKET that has EXPECTATIONS.

    a dramatic change in macroeconomic policiy as Koo advocates would of course alter these expectations and with it the availabilty and price of (sovereign) credit.

    let´s say politicians all over the world suddenly convert to “stimulate to infinity”.

    to me as a potential creditor, a buyer of sovereign debt that would translate into:

    -debt won´t be a last resort measure if balancing fails. it becomes a systemic tool which every local/sovereign government will make “pain free” use of
    -therefore the amount of debt will increase substantially
    -paying back debt is NOT the first priority of the government any longer
    -the return of my capital is highly dependent on the return of sufficient economic growth AND the willingness of new creditors to finance deficits

    one could argue that the last two points are already existent in todays market.
    everybody knows that todays deficits cannot ever be paid back.
    but at least on paper there is a hard commitment to rebalance the budget by spending cuts/raising taxes to pay back the debt.
    imo there´s still a substantial part of the market that believes that the political leaders will at least try to honor that commitment.
    if you kill that commitment you both lose that part of the market and as mentioned above the debt supply will explode.

    the effect cannot be quantified right now.
    but i expect that volume would drop and interest rates would skyrocket killing the great plan and the existing budgets over night.

    that would be a fun experiment:
    let´s say you have a listed company that is losing money every quarter.
    they have no clear time table to profitability and they don´t intend on lowering costs. instead they release a statement that from now on they´ll raise equity only, thereby diluting current and future stockholders until they finally reach profitability. guess what the market would do to their stock price and what discounts will be required to attract new investor with every follow on offering…

    but let´s say the bond market doesn´t break for now.
    we follow Koo and stimulate for another 5years until the economy is back at 2007 levels.
    then what? we´re again at the savings part of the theory. nobody will do it.

    the economy might see another up cycle of 5years self sustained growth
    over that time period the deficit at best will grow slowly.
    imo it will grow faster than during historic growth cycles because politicians will make heavier use of debt when justified by Koos theory.

    sooner or later the natural imbalances of the cycle will reappear and the economy will be faced with another recession.

    then again – stimulate,stimulate,stimulate.
    send the deficit higher again.

    sooner or later we´ll get to the point that either interest rates or the sheer size of the deficit will get the bond market to break.
    we´re on track for this outcome right now as well.
    but with Koos policy we might reach that point much faster.
    and if so the consequences would be even harder since his policy doens´t allow for periodically built bubbles to correct.

    to sum it up:

    -it´s unclear to what point saturated economies can be stimulated
    -higher risk taking, higher inflation likely
    -the mirror of stimulating – saving will never happen
    -sovereign debt supply would explode
    -market expectations and with it interest rates and liquidity would change suddenly
    -the inevitable self correcting mechanism of the economy would only be delayed, endgame unclear, potentially devastating

  • RSDallas

    I think Koo has it exactly right on the “balance sheet recession” definition and he may even be somewhat right on the government spending side of his arguments. Although I am less inclined to support this objective due primarily to the wasteful nature and ineffective allocation of resources that occurs when the government gets involved.

    I think where he and others are wrong is he doesn’t give the elevated (false) current asset price enough consideration. All these banks, financial institutions and many private party investors still account for these sour assets at very high prices. So the debt just continues to hang around and acts as a huge weight on the borrower (public or private). It’s no different than the homeowner who can’t sell his home because he won’t face the facts that his home is just not worth what he thinks it is. You find this even in good times.

    Therefore the asset value needs to be dealt; henceforth the debt to value formula is out of wack . More debt needs to be paid off, or asset value write downs need to occur to re-balance the equity to value formula. Let the market find the price for the asset and make the owner or lender recognize the asset price at today’s price.. Some call this the liquidation approach and proclaim that the economy follows the decreasing asset value straight down. I don’t buy that. What happens is it gets us to a balanced economy quicker.