SOROS: WHY IGNORING HISTORY THREATENS THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

The following speech was given by George Soros this afternoon at Columbia University.  You may not agree with Mr. Soros’s politics, but he is one of the few people I regularly read who truly understands the macro environment and the ways of the global financial system.  He touches on some salient points here including the following:

  • Why we are not out of the woods
  • Why global imbalances remain
  • Why the Euro is fatally flawed
  • Why deflation remains the greater risk
  • How policy makers are ignoring the mistakes of the past

The full speech follows.  I highly recommend reading it in its entirety:

“As you know I have written several books which serve to explain the crash of 2008. Two years have elapsed since then – it is time to bring the story up to date. That is what I propose to do today.

The theory I shall use is the same as in my previous books, so I shall not repeat it here. The main points to remember are, first, that rational human beings do not base their decisions on reality but on their understanding of reality and the two are never the same – although the extent of the divergence does vary from person to person and from time to time – and it is the variance that matters. This is the principle of fallibility. Second, the participants’ misconceptions, as expressed in market prices, affect the so-called fundamentals which market prices are supposed to reflect. This is the principle of reflexivity. The two of them together assure that both market participants and regulators have to make their decisions in conditions of uncertainty. This is the human uncertainty principle. It implies that outcomes are unlikely to correspond to expectations and markets are unable to assure the optimum allocation of resources. These implications are in direct contradiction to the theory of rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis.

The extent and degree of uncertainty is itself uncertain and variable. Conditions may range from near-equilibrium to far from equilibrium. Again, it is the variance that matters. In practice markets have a tendency to move towards one of these extremes rather than to hover near a historical or theoretical midpoint between them. In evolutionary systems theory these extremes are called “strange attractors”. My contention is that financial markets tend towards these strange attractors, not to equilibrium. So much for theory.  Now for the actual course of events.

In the crash of 2008 the uncertainties reached such an extreme that the markets actually collapsed.  But that was a short lived phenomenon. The authorities intervened and managed to keep the markets functioning by putting them on artificial life support. In retrospect, the momentary collapse may seem like a bad dream, but it was real enough and two years later we still suffer from its consequences.

Let me explain why.

When a car is skidding you have to turn the wheel in the direction of the skid to prevent the car from crashing. Only when you have regained control can you correct the direction of the car. That is how the financial authorities had to deal with the crash. The underlying cause of the crash was the excessive use of credit and leverage. To prevent a catastrophe they had to avoid a sharp contraction of credit. The only way to do it was to replace the private credit that lost credibility with the credit of the state which still commanded respect. Only after financial markets resumed functioning could they hope to reverse course and reduce the outstanding credit and leverage. This meant that they had to do in the short term the exact opposite of what would be needed in the long term.

The first phase of this delicate maneuver has now been successfully completed. Financial markets are functioning more or less normally with toxic credit instruments replaced or guaranteed by sovereign credit. But the second phase is running into difficulties. Before the economy has recovered and unemployment has fallen, the credibility of sovereign credit has come into question. If governments are now forced to pursue fiscal discipline and tighten monetary and fiscal policy too soon there is a danger that the recovery will stall. That is because the imbalances that have accumulated over a quarter of a century have not yet been corrected. The US still consumes too much and China is still running an unsustainable export surplus vis-à-vis the US. A similar imbalance prevails within the eurozone, with Germany in the surplus position. In addition, the housing and commercial real estate bubbles in the US have not yet been fully deflated and in the eurozone the banks have not yet been properly recapitalized. The deleveraging of the private sector is underway, but it is far from complete. In the US it applies to banks, corporations and households alike. In Europe it is heavily concentrated in the banking sector.

Because the global imbalances which were at the root of the financial crisis still remain to be corrected, the question arises: How much government debt is too much? That is one of the central questions confronting policymakers today.

The discussion is eerily reminiscent of the 1930s. Then the fiscal conservatives led by Andrew Mellon and Irving Fisher were confronted by rebels led by John Maynard Keynes.  Now, the division of opinion is more along national lines. The center of fiscal conservatism is Germany, while those who have rediscovered Keynes are located mainly in the United States.

The clash of views has led to a drama which is unfolding differently in different parts of the world. The remarkable unanimity that prevailed in the first phase of the crisis and culminated in the one trillion dollar rescue package that was put together for the London meeting of the G20 in April 2009 has dissipated and political and ideological differences have arisen. Misconceptions are rampant.  They complicate matters enormously because it would require global cooperation to correct the global imbalances.

I shall briefly review how the credibility of sovereign credit came to be questioned in various parts of the world and then I shall address the question – how much debt is too much?

Doubts concerning sovereign credit first reached a crisis point in Europe and they revolved around the euro. But what appeared to be a currency crisis was in reality more a banking crisis and a clash of economic philosophies.

The euro was an incomplete currency to start with. The Maastricht Treaty established a monetary union without a political union. The euro boasted a common central bank but it lacked a common treasury.

So even though member countries share a common currency, when it comes to sovereign credit they are on their own.  Unfortunately, this fact was obscured until recently by the willingness of the European Central Bank to accept the sovereign debt of all member countries on equal terms at its discount window.  This allowed the member countries to borrow at practically the same interest rate as Germany and the banks were happy to earn a few extra pennies on supposedly risk-free assets by loading up their balance sheets with the government debt of the weaker countries.  For instance, European banks hold more than a trillion euro’s of Spanish debt of which more than half is held by German and French banks. The large positions came to endanger the creditworthiness of the European banking system, depriving them of the capacity to add to their positions.

Although it was the inability of the banks to continue accumulating the government debt of the heavily indebted countries that precipitated the crisis, but it was the introduction of the euro and ECB’s willingness to refinance sovereign debt that got the banks weighed down with these large positions in the first place.  It led to a radical narrowing of interest rate differentials and that, in turn, generated real estate bubbles in countries like Spain, Greece, and Ireland. Instead of the convergence prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty, these countries grew faster and developed trade deficits within the eurozone, while Germany reigned in its labor costs, became more competitive and developed a chronic trade surplus. The discount facility of the ECB allowed the deficit countries to continue borrowing at practically the same rates as Germany, relieving them of any pressure to correct their excesses. So the introduction of the euro was indirectly responsible for the development of internal imbalances within the eurozone.

The first clear reminder that the euro lacked a common treasury came after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The finance ministers of the European Union promised that no other financial institution whose failure could endanger the system would be allowed to default.  But Angela Merkel opposed a joint Europe-wide guarantee; each country had to take care of its own banks.

At first, the financial markets were so impressed by the guarantee that they hardly noticed the difference.  Capital fled from the countries which were not in a position to offer similar guarantees pushing the countries of Eastern Europe, notably Hungary and the Baltic States into difficulties. But interest rate differentials within the eurozone remained minimal.

It was only this year that financial markets started to worry about the accumulation of sovereign debt within the eurozone. Greece started the process when the newly elected government revealed that the previous government had lied and the deficit for 2009 was much larger than indicated.

Markets panicked and interest rate differentials widened dramatically. But the European authorities were slow to react because member countries held radically different views.   Germany, which had been traumatized by two episodes of runaway inflation, was adamantly opposed to any bailout. France was more willing to show its solidarity. Since Germany was heading for elections, it was unwilling to act, and nothing could be done without Germany. So the Greek crisis festered and spread.  When the authorities finally got their act together they had to offer a much larger rescue package than would have been necessary if they had acted earlier.

In the meantime, doubts about the creditworthyness of sovereign debt spread to the other deficit countries and, in order to reassure the markets, the authorities had to put together a €750 billion European Financial Stabilization Fund, €500 billion from the member states and €250 billion from the IMF.  The turning point came when China re-entered the market and bought Spanish bonds and the euro.

So, under duress, the euro has begun to remedy its main shortcoming, the lack of a common treasury. The Stabilization Fund is very far from a unified fiscal policy, but it is a step in that direction. Member countries are now a little bit pregnant and they will be obliged to take additional steps if necessary. So the crisis has passed its high water mark and the euro is here to stay. But it is far too early to celebrate because the emerging common fiscal policy is dictated by Germany and Germany is wedded to a false doctrine of macro-economic stability which recognizes only the threat of inflation and ignores the possibility of deflation.

This misconception is incorporated in the constitution of the euro. When Germany agreed to substitute the euro for Deutschmark it insisted on strong safeguards to maintain the value of the currency. As a result, the ECB was given an asymmetric directive. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty contains a clause that expressly prohibits bailouts and the ban has been reaffirmed by the German Constitutional Court. It is this clause that has made the crisis so difficult to deal with.

This brings me to the gravest defect in the euro’s design; it does not allow for error. It expects member states to abide by the Maastricht criteria without establishing an adequate enforcement mechanism. And now, when practically all member countries are in violation of the Maastricht criteria, there is neither an adjustment mechanism nor an exit mechanism.

Now these countries are expected to return to the Maastricht criteria in short order. What is worse, Germany is not only insisting on strict fiscal discipline for the weaker countries but is also reducing its own fiscal deficit. When both creditor and debtor countries are reducing deficits at a time of high unemployment they set in motion a deflationary spiral in debtor countries. Reductions in employment, tax receipts, and consumption reinforce each other and are not offset by exports, raising the prospect that deficit reduction targets will not be met and further reductions will be required. And even if budgetary targets were met, it is difficult to see how the weaker countries could regain their competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany and start growing again because, in the absence of exchange rate depreciation, they need to cut wages and prices, creating deflation. And deflation renders the burden of accumulated debt even heavier.

Deficit reduction by a creditor country such as Germany is in direct contradiction of the lessons learnt from the Great Depression of the 1930s. It is liable to push Europe into a period of prolonged stagnation or worse. That may, in turn, produce social unrest and, since the unpopular policies are imposed from the outside, turn public opinion against the European Union. So the euro, with its asymmetric directive, may endanger the social and political cohesion of Europe.

Unfortunately, Germany is unlikely to realize that it is following the wrong macroeconomic policy because that policy is actually working to its advantage. Germany is the shining star in the economic firmament. It dealt with the burden of reunification by reducing its labor costs becoming more competitive and developing a chronic trade surplus.  And the euro-crisis brought about a decline in the value of the euro. This favored Germany against its main competitor, Japan. In the second quarter of 2010 the GDP jumped by 9% annualized.

Germany believes it is doing the right thing. It has no desire to impose its will on Europe; all it wants to do is to maintain its competitiveness and avoid becoming the deep pocket to the rest of Europe. But as the strongest and most creditworthy country it is in the driver’s seat. As a result Germany objectively determines the financial and macroeconomic policies of the Eurozone without being subjectively aware of it.  And the policies it is imposing on the eurozone are liable to send the eurozone into a deflationary spiral.  But people in Germany are unlikely to recognize this because they are doing much better than the others and the difficulties of the others can be blamed on structural rigidities.

The German commitment to fiscal rectitude is also gaining the upper hand in the rest of the world. Angela Merkel went into the recent G20 meeting in the minority and – with the help of the host country, Canada, and the newly elected Conservative British Prime Minister, David Cameron – came out as the winner. Prior to the meeting President Obama publicly appealed to Chancellor Angela Merkel to change her ways, but at the meeting the US yielded to the majority and agreed that budget deficits should be cut in half by 2013. This may be the right policy but it comes at the wrong time.

The policies of the Obama administration are dictated not by financial necessity but by political considerations. The US is not under the same pressure from the bond markets as the heavily indebted states of Europe. European debtor countries have to pay hefty premiums over the price at which Germany can borrow. By contrast, interest rates on US government bonds have been falling and are near record lows. This means that financial markets anticipate deflation not inflation.

The pressure is entirely political. The public is deeply troubled by the accumulation of public debt. The Republican opposition has succeeded in blaming the Crash of 2008 and the subsequent recession and persistent high unemployment on the ineptitude of government and in claiming that the stimulus package was largely wasted.

There is an element of truth in this narrative but it is far too one sided. The Crash of 2008 was primarily a market failure and the fault of the regulators was that they failed to regulate. Without a bailout the financial system would have stayed paralyzed and the subsequent recession would have been much deeper and longer.  It is true that the stimulus was largely wasted but that was because most of it went to sustain consumption and did not correct the underlying imbalances.  As I explained earlier, the government was obliged to do in the short run the exact opposite of what is needed in the long run.  Now consumption still needs to fall as a percentage of the GDP and fiscal and monetary stimulus are still needed to keep the GDP from falling and to prevent a deflationary spiral.

Where the Obama administration did go wrong, in my opinion, was in the way it bailed out the banking system: it helped the banks earn their way out of a hole by supplying them with cheap money and relieving them of some of their bad assets. But this was an entirely political decision; on a strictly economic calculation it would have been more effective to inject new equity into the balance sheets of the banks. But the Obama administration considered that politically unacceptable because it would amounted to nationalizing the banks and it would have been called socialism.

That political decision backfired and caused a serious political backlash. The public saw the banks earning bumper profits and paying large bonuses while they were badly squeezed by their credit card charges jumping from 8% to nearly 30%. That was the source of the resentment that the Tea Party exploited so successfully.  In addition, the administration had deployed the so-called “confidence multiplier” to restore confidence and that turned to disappointment when unemployment failed to fall.

The Administration is now on the defensive. The Republicans are campaigning against any further stimulus and they seem to be winning the argument. The administration feels that it has to pay lip service to fiscal rectitude even if it recognizes that the timing may be premature.

I disagree.  I believe there is a strong case for further stimulus.  Admittedly, consumption cannot be sustained indefinitely by running up the national debt. The imbalance between consumption and investment needs to be corrected. But to cut back on government spending at a time of large-scale unemployment would ignore all the lessons learned from the Great Depression.

The obvious solution is to draw a distinction in the budget between investments and current consumption and increase the former while reducing the latter. But that seems unattainable in the current political environment. A large majority of the population is convinced that the government is incapable of efficiently managing an investment program aimed at improving the physical and human infrastructure. Again, this belief is not without justification: a quarter of a century of agitation calling the government bad has resulted in bad government. But the argument that stimulus spending is inevitably wasted is patently false: the New Deal produced the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Triborough Bridge.

It is the Obama administration that has failed to make a convincing case. There are times like the present when we cannot count on the private sector to employ the available resources. The Obama administration has in fact been very friendly to business. Corporations operate very profitably, but instead of investing their profits, they are building up their liquidity. Perhaps a Republican victory will give them more confidence; but in its absence investment and employment needs to be stimulated by the government.  I do not believe that monetary policy can be successfully substituted for fiscal policy.  Quantitative easing is more likely to stimulate corporations to devour each other than to create employment.  We shall soon find out.

This brings us to the question I raised earlier. How much room does the government have for fiscal stimulus? How much public debt is too much? This is not the only unresolved question but it is at the center of political debate and the debate is riddled with misconceptions.

That is because the question does not have a hard and fast answer. In saying this I am not being evasive; on the contrary, I am making an important assertion. The tolerance for public debt is highly dependent on the participants’ perceptions and misconceptions. In other words it is reflexive.

There are a number of variables involved. To start with, the debt burden is not an absolute amount but a ratio between the debt and the GDP. The higher the GDP the smaller the burden represented by a given amount of debt. The other important variable is the interest rate: the higher the interest rate the heavier the debt burden. In this context the risk premium attached to the interest rate is particularly important: once it starts rising, the prevailing rate of deficit financing becomes unsustainable and needs to be reigned in. Exactly where the tipping point is located remains uncertain because it is dependent on prevailing attitudes.

Take the case of Japan: its debt ratio is approaching 200%, one of the highest in the world. Yet ten year bonds yield little more than 1%. Admittedly, Japan used to have a high savings rate but it has an ageing and shrinking population and its current savings rate is about the same as the US. The big difference is that Japan has a trade surplus and the US a deficit. But that is not such a big difference as long as China does not allow its currency to appreciate because that policy obliges China to finance the deficit one way or another.

The real reason why Japanese interest rates are so low is that the private sector – individuals, banks and corporations – have little appetite for investing abroad and prefer ten year government bonds at a 1% to cash at zero percent.  With the price level falling and the population aging, the real return on such instruments is considered attractive by the Japanese.  As long as US banks can borrow at near zero and buy government bonds without having to commit equity and the dollar is not allowed to depreciate against the renminbi, interest rates on US government bonds may well be heading in the same direction.

That is not to say that it would be sound policy for the US to maintain interest rates at zero and preserve the current imbalances by issuing government debt indefinitely. Once the economy starts growing again interest rates will rise and if the accumulated debt is too big it may rise precipitously, choking off the recovery. But premature fiscal tightening may choke off the recovery prematurely.

The right policy is to reduce the imbalances as fast as possible while keeping the increase in the debt burden to a minimum. This can be done in a number of ways but cutting the budget deficit in half by 2013 while the economy operating far below capacity is not one of them. Investing in infrastructure and education makes more sense. So does engineering a moderate rate of inflation by depreciating the dollar against the renminbi. What stands in the way are misconceptions about budget deficits exploited for partisan and ideological purposes.  There is a real danger that the premature pursuit of fiscal rectitude may wreck the recovery.”

Cullen Roche

Mr. Roche is the Founder of Orcam Financial Group, LLC. Orcam is a financial services firm offering research, private advisory, institutional consulting and educational services.

More Posts - Website

Follow Me:
TwitterLinkedIn

Comments

  1. Soros wants Ben to print more so he can profit from his short dollar long gold trade, he did pick a good day for a speech since the dollar is crashing thru support and gold hitting new highs. He states two posible outcomes we make it thru or get sucked down, that next g20 meeting will set the tone it will be interesting to see if Obama has the balls to go against the majority who want austerity and what will be the outcome of that decision.

    • Indeed we all live in very interesting times… almost makes you believe in 2012 prophecies!

    • I agree that Obama and the Republicans will initially create gridlock. If the economy continues to grow slowly, gridlock may be the best economic policy. If we take a turn for the worse, we may need both sides to cooperate before the situation deteriorates. In that situation, if they fail to compromise fast enough and around an effective policy, then it could get real ugly.

  2. Soros looks out for George Soros and no one else.He patently lied in saying that “the Obama administration had been very friendly to business”. IMO the Austrian solution is going to happen regardless. We can put it off for 20 years as Japan has, but in the end that will only prolong and worsen the outcome. We should have allowed the insolvent firms and banks go out of business. Then all of the money that we have wasted could have been used to help those in need until businesses started growing and hiring again. Obama instead has attacked businesses ( who create the jobs we need) and given most of the money to the people who caused the crisis. What a waste!

  3. It seems all the “authorities”, public and private are determined to completely destroy the credibility of paper currency or however you want to consider our imaginary money. It has always been true that unbacked paper money is completely unstable and rarely lasts very long and that it has only ever been paper rectangles.

    The problem is that we cannot demystify this openly and publicly so as to make anyone who accepts it in exchange for a tangible good a complete fool.

    If inflation is intentionally generated as government policy that may likely be the end of paper money.

    Everyone should think very carefully as to whether or not they wish to surrender the policy convenience of fiat currency at this point.

    At the current rate we will have no alternative but the Gold Standard or some other form of hard money.

  4. With All Due Respect TPC, George Soros is a Lying Thieving Self Focused Snake that can not bet trusted for SHIT.

    I only can get a few paragraphs into his deceptive Bull Shit and then I can stomach No More.

    He speaks of fiscal events as if they are some how nascent and only need the proper authorities (Who in fact CAUSED the events) to remedy the situation with a simple stroke of XYZ.

    As others have posted before me, Soros is All about himself and nothing more.

    He is NO FINANCIAL GURU, He is a Snake Oil Sales man to Political Hacks and he plays the game well.
    Just Like Madoff Did.

    JMHO..

    • That is not an argument. Why don’t you make an ecoonomic instead of spreading your bad odors around. Probably because you can’t make an argument to save your life–or anything, in fact.

      You and the rest of the PM-idol worshippers can’t get it into your heads that gold is priced in DOLLARS!

      • You can get everything priced in grams of gold, if you wish.

        http://pricedingold.com/

        As for the substance of GS’s ignorance, it’s self-evident in statements like:

        “This meant that they had to do in the short term the exact opposite of what would be needed in the long term.”

      • Is this what you want?

        “In the crash of 2008 the uncertainties reached such an extreme that the markets actually collapsed. But that was a short lived phenomenon. The authorities intervened and managed to keep the markets functioning by putting them on artificial life support. In retrospect, the momentary collapse may seem like a bad dream, but it was real enough and two years later we still suffer from its consequences.”

        WRONG, It was “the authorities” in the first place with EASY MONEY policy of the Greenspan/Bernanke era that laid the tender for the fire.

        To claim that these arsonists should be merited with any credibility for putting out the fire in which they fueled is ludicrous.

        “When a car is skidding you have to turn the wheel in the direction of the skid to prevent the car from crashing. Only when you have regained control can you correct the direction of the car. That is how the financial authorities had to deal with the crash.”

        Wrong again, You do not let INIBRIATED policy makers behind the wheel in the first place.

        “The first phase of this delicate maneuver has now been successfully completed. Financial markets are functioning more or less normally with toxic credit instruments replaced or guaranteed by sovereign credit”

        Hmmm, so ” keeping asset prices higher than they otherwise would be” Bryan Sack @ the NYF.

        Is Mr Soros Idea of a “NORMAL” functioning mkt..

        I am reserving my comment on this one as you should be able to discern for yourself what is now “Normal” in Mr Soros world.

        Should I go on?

  5. Keep in mind the Quantum Fund returned over 30% for 30 years! That makes it the most successful hedge fund of all time. Sorry guys, that also makes him a financial guru.

    I think he nails the macro risks perfectly. Austerity comes at a terrible time and threatens the global economy. But no worries, QE will save us.

    • I agree. Hate the man all you want for his politics, but he knows how the economy works. He’s one of the few in my opinion and therefore always worth listening to.

  6. The Soros view is short sighted. Fiat money is the cause of the problem and the problem is debt. At the current level, 400% debt to GDP, any additional fiscal stimulus is going to fail, it will simply make the numerator (bad) grow larger. We are headed to a Shumpeterian ‘creative’ destruction depression. Deleveraging is not happening fast enough. The final solution is not regulation or stimulus, it’s a free banking system which replaces the obviously obsolete Federal Reserve.
    SERIOUSLY, Soros’ belief of ‘properly’ invested stimulus has to be a non starter with the debt at such a high level. In the 80′s $3 of GDP was generated for every $1 of debt. During the stimulus, the ratio was nearly reversed. 800 billion of spent stimulus generated 200 billion of additional GDP, assuming all the money went to ‘stimulus’ (Q2 2009 to Q2 2010 1.5% growth, ALLOWING FOR INVENTORY SMOOTHING). Soros’ math is not correct and I’m afraid he’s looking out for his own interest. You can make my math look better, but the end result is the same, a collapse is coming and we’re making it worse by postponing it. This is not politics, it’s basic math. Can you really pay debt of 400% relative to your income, even with interest at 0%?

  7. It’s time to flush the system. Someone has to pay the piper at some point. Will we ever learn? More stimulus? Soros is a fool who simply hopes that the government ponzi scheme continues to boost his stock portfolio.

  8. One note: Soros has not generated all of the Quantum fund’s returns himself. For example, there was a long period when Druckenmiller was the main trader, Soros oversaw only. Druckenmiller had the bet against the GBP, Soros encouraged him to increase it.

  9. Additionally, he has produced “only” about 20% annualized ROR with 20% annualized volatility for investors. I think Druckenmiller’s fund had better ROR.

  10. TPC, thanks for printing that. I read some of the article at Huffington Post and was amazed at the readers responses, which resembled some of the responses here. I’d like to make a suggestion. If anyone really wants to convince another person of something, he should point out points in the person’s argument and either agree or disagree. It seems that pointless character assassinations only tell more about the lack of credence of the critic’s argument than about the subject matter being critiqued. In other words, just tell us what you agree or disagree with. A person hurts his own case with anger and slander.

  11. I disagree with Mr. Soros’ politics and I think they cloud his analysis – but only just a bit. He gives the Obama administration a pass for not being anti-business since business profits have rebounded under the administration. That is true as far as it goes. What he fails to mention is the HUGH increase in uncertainty the administration engineered with legislation starting but not limited to the health care legislation.

    At one point he mentioned the tipping point which limits stimulus:

    “In this context the risk premium attached to the interest rate is particularly important: once it starts rising, the prevailing rate of deficit financing becomes unsustainable and needs to be reigned in. Exactly where the tipping point is located remains uncertain because it is dependent on prevailing attitudes.”

    I think TPC regularly underemphasises the risk of reaching this point.

  12. TPC, thanks for posting the entire speech. It’s worth reading over again.

    I also want to express my appreciation for your objective, independent thinking.

    I gain from thoughtful conservative and liberal writings, and from different economic perspectives. It makes no sense to me to be blinkered by emotional attachment to one view.

  13. Soros is a VERY smart investor but he sold out to the Illuminati a long time ago. Now, the elite use him as their puppet so that he can mislead everyone.

    He has now become a snake oil salesman! A truly corrupt speculator.

  14. interesting article, a little confusing, however I do not recall that governments
    have ever gotton it right. Everyone is out for there self interest, and that includes individual countries also, i see a real mess brewing out there.